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Designing the Decider
EMILY

s. BREMER*

ABSTRACT

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) contains several provisions designed
to ensure that presiding officials in so-called formal adjudications are able to
make fair, well-informed, independent decisions. But these provisions do not
apply to the vast majority of federal adjudicatory hearings. In this world of
adjudication outside the APA, agencies enjoy broad procedural discretion,
including substantial freedom to "design the decider." This Article defines the
scope of this discretion and explores how various agencies have exercised it.
The discussion is enriched by examples drawn from an expansive new database
of federal adjudicatory procedures. The Article argues that, although agency
discretion to design the decider has benefits, it also imperils independent
decision making, destroys government-wide uniformity, and undermines
transparency.
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INTRODUCTION

Studying federal administrative adjudication on a system-wide basis is a
daunting endeavor. Few agencies conduct proceedings according to the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) adjudication provisions. 1 Most proceedings are
not subject to this legal framework and are conducted according to procedures
tailor-made to suit the specific needs of the adjudicating agency and the relevant
program. Congress sometimes cultivates these tailored processes by enacting
agency- or program-specific procedural requirements.2 But even when Congress
is involved, agencies bear much of the responsibility for crafting the details of
their own, unique adjudicatory processes. This reality is facilitated by a fundamental administrative law principle that affords agencies broad discretion over
their own procedures. 3 The exercise of this procedural discretion has yielded
breathtaking variety across the hundreds of adjudicatory programs that exist
throughout the federal government. Perhaps as a consequence, most scholars
who study administrative adjudication focus on a particular agency, program, or
procedural device. Doing so is necessary to make the endeavor manageable.
This Article examines a narrow but important component of federal administrative adjudication: the rules that define the nature, position, and powers of the
officials who preside over hearings. 4 As with other aspects of administrative
procedure, agencies have broad discretion to make these rules, i.e., to "design
the decider." To help explore the scope and exercise of this discretion, this
Article draws on a recent government-wide study of adjudication that was
commissioned by the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS)
and funded in part by Stanford Law School. 5 In addition to a report authored by
Professor Michael Asimow, 6 the Conference's researcher, this study produced
an ACUS recommendation 7 and a publicly available online database of the
procedures observed in hundreds of federal adjudicatory programs. 8 Examples
l. See 5 U.S.C. § 554, 556, 557 (2012).
2. See Michael Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella: Extending the APA's Adjudication Provisions to
All Evidentiary Hearings Required by Statute, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 1003, 1006 (2004).
3. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,524 (1978).
4. See Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAv1s L. REv. 1643 (2016).
5. ACUS is a free-standing federal agency that studies administrative procedure and makes recommendations for improvement to other agencies, the President, Congress, and the Judicial Conference. See 5
U.S.C. §§ 591-96 (2012). The agency is composed of 100 members drawn from government and the
private sector, headed by a chairman who is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate. Recommendations are developed through a research-driven, consensus-based process and
are adopted by the full Assembly (i.e., the whole membership) during semi-annual plenary sessions. See
ADMIN. CoNF. OF THE U.S., https://www.acus.gov/about-administrative-conference-united-states-acus
[https://perma.cc/2QRM-NUQM].
6. See MICHAEL ASIMOW, EvIDENTIARY HEARINGS OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (2016),
https ://www. acus. gov/ sites/default/files/documents/ adj udication-outside-the-adminis trati veprocedure-act-final-report_ O. pdf [https://perma.cc/DH76-J7NM].
7. See Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2016-4, Evidentiary Hearings Not Required by
the Administrative Procedure Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,312, 94,314 (Dec. 23, 2016).
8. See ADJUDICATION RESEARCH: JOINT PROJECT OF ACUS AND STAN. L. ScH. [hereinafter ADJUDICATION
RESEARCH], https://acus.law.stanford.edu/ [https://perma.cc/PS67-GPMF].
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drawn from this database illustrate the broad variation that results from the
exercise of agency discretion to design the decider. This Article argues that,
although this discretion has benefits, it also undermines decision-maker independence, government-wide uniformity, and transparency. These costs deserve
greater attention.

I.

THE LANDSCAPE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION

Federal administrative adjudication is traditionally divided into only two
types: "formal" adjudication, which is conducted in accord with the APA's
adjudication provisions 9 and "informal" adjudication, for which the APA does
not provide specific procedural requirements. 10 Although widely used, these
terms are problematic. One difficulty is that so-called informal adjudication is
often conducted according to procedures that are as or more formal (in the
colloquial sense of "trial-like") than the procedures specified by the APA's
"formal" adjudication provisions. 11 Moreover, the vast majority of agency
adjudication is "informal." Even before the APA's 1946 enactment, informal
adjudication was referred to as "the life blood of the administrative process," a
description that remains accurate to this day. 12 Although ubiquitous, this "life
blood" is profoundly non-uniform. In sum, the category of "informal" adjudication is so vast and various that treating it as a monolithic whole obscures more
than it reveals.
For these reasons, this Article will eschew the traditional formal-informal
dichotomy in favor of a classification scheme developed by Professor Michael Asimow
and used in his recent study of administrative adjudication conducted for the ACUS. 13

9. See 5 U.S.C. § 554,556,557 (2012).
10. E.g., Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 873 F.2d 325, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(explaining that "no provision of the APA contains specific procedures to govern an informal agency
adjudication"); Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 739,
744 (1976) ("[A]dministrative decision making labeled here as informal adjudication is largely unaddressed procedurally by the APA .... "). 5 U.S.C. § 555 (2012), which addresses "ancillary matters,"
such as the right to counsel for those compelled to appear before an agency, may be relevant in some
informal adjudications. See OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION: EVALUATING THE STATUS AND PLACEMENT OF ADJUDICATORS IN THE FEDERAL
SECTOR HEARING PROGRAM 35 (Mar. 31, 2014) [hereinafter EEOC REPORT], https://www.acus.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/FINAL%20EEOC%20Final%20Report%20%5B3-31- l 4%5D.pdf [https://perma.
cc/CYN7-6TZH]. Similarly, 5 U.S.C. § 558 (2012) may also "provide some meager protections in these
cases." Asimow, supra note 2, at 1006 n.16.
II. See AsIMow, supra note 6, at 3.
12. Verkuil, supra note 10, at 744 (quoting ArTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT 35 (1941)).
13. See AsIMow, supra note 6; see also Asimow, supra note 2, at 1005-06 (introducing the
classification scheme).
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Professor Asimow's scheme divides administrative adjudication into three
categories:
• Type A Adjudication includes agency adjudications that are conducted
in accordance with the APA's adjudication provisions. 14
• Type B Adjudication includes proceedings that are conducted outside of
the APA's adjudication provisions, but are subject to some legal requirement (imposed by statute, regulation, or executive order) that a decision
be issued following an evidentiary hearing. 15 An "evidentiary hearing"
is "a proceeding [in] which the parties make evidentiary submissions,
have an opportunity to rebut testimony and arguments made by the
opposition, and to which the exclusive record principle applies." 16
Under the "exclusive record principle," the decider "is confined to
considering inputs from the parties (as well as matters officially noticed)
when determining factual issues." 17
• Type C Adjudication includes proceedings that are neither conducted in
accord with the APA's adjudication provisions nor subject to any other
legal requirement for an evidentiary hearing. 18

Type A adjudication is the category traditionally referred to as "formal"
adjudication. 19 Together, Type B and Type C adjudication form the category
traditionally referred to as "informal" adjudication. Avoiding that term, this
Article will occasionally refer to Types B and C together as "non-APA"
adjudication or "adjudication outside of the APA. " 20
For several interrelated reasons, this Article will focus on the scope and
exercise of agency discretion in Type B proceedings. First, the category of Type
A adjudication is relatively small, procedurally uniform, and has been well
studied.2 1 In contrast, and as previously noted, most administrative adjudication

14. See 5 U.S.C. § 554, 556, and 557 (2012). See generally AsJMow, supra note 6, at 2 (explaining
the three categories of agency adjudication).
15. See As1Mow, supra note 6, at 2, 10.
16. Id. at 4, 10.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2; see also id. at 4 ("In the case of Type C adjudication ... no evidentiary hearing is legally
required, and usually no such hearing occurs."').
19. See, e.g., Verkuil, supra note 10.
20. See As1Mow, supra note 6. The notion of adjudication conducted "outside of the APA" might
strike some as peculiar given that there are provisions of the APA that are frequently cited as governing
informal adjudication. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 555, 558 (2012); see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV
Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 655 (1990) ("The determination in this case ... was lawfully made by informal
adjudication, the minimal requirements for which are set forth in § 555 of the APA."). Although these
provisions may have some relevance in non-APA adjudication, they by no means provide an adjudicative analog to the APA's informal rulemaking provisions. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
21. See As1Mow, supra note 6, at 2.
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is conducted outside of the APA. 22 Second, the scope of agency discretion-and
therefore the range of procedural variation-is greater in non-APA adjudication
than it is in Type A adjudication. 23 This is because the APA establishes uniform
procedural requirements for Type A proceedings, but does not do so for Type B
and Type C proceedings. Although Type A adjudication offers a useful, fixed
point of comparison, non-APA adjudication is in greater need of examination.
Finally, there is significantly more information available about Type B adjudication than there is about Type C adjudication. ACUS's recent study comprehensively catalogues Type A and Type B proceedings, offering a rich source of
data. 24 Focusing on Type B proceedings takes advantage of this reality and
confines the project to a manageable scope.

II.

AGENCY DISCRETION TO DESIGN THE DECIDER

Agencies generally have broad discretion to design the procedures they
observe, including in adjudicatory proceedings. The Constitution's Due Process
Clause, the APA, and other statutes establish minimum procedural requirements.
Provided that agencies observe these minimum requirements, however, courts
typically afford agencies substantial leeway to determine what procedures they
will follow. In Type A proceedings, the APA requires that "the agency," "one or
more members of the body which comprises the agency," or an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) must preside over the taking of evidence. 25 This requirement
does not apply, however, to adjudications conducted outside of the APA. Thus,
in the Type B proceedings with which this Article is particularly concerned, a
non-AU adjudicator may preside. The agency has substantial latitude to design
the identity and powers of this "decider." 26 This Part situates this procedural
discretion within the more familiar aspects of administrative discretion before
exploring the ways in which it is exercised.

22. See, e.g., AsIMow, supra note 6, at 3 (explaining that Type C adjudications are "vastly more
numerous than Type B"').
23. The variation among agencies is staggering. E.g., James E. Moliterno, The Administrative
Judiciary's Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1191, 1196 (2006) ("[T]he role of the
administrative judge is not merely complex in its generic form, but also varies further from agency to
agency, taking into account the unique mission, history, and political setting of each agency.").
24. See AsIMow, supra note 6, at 2 ("The database contains information about all of the schemes of
Type A and Type B federal agency adjudication (with the exceptions of military and foreign affairs
adjudication, which were omitted because of resource constraints).").
25. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2012).
26. This Article uses the terms "decider," "presider," and "adjudicator" interchangeably. As Section
B.l. explains, however, this person's title is one of the many elements over which agencies have
discretion. And so, there is considerable variety in the terminology across agencies that conduct Type B
proceedings.
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A. Taking Account of Procedural Discretion
Discussions of administrative discretion often focus on agencies' substantive
discretion in the realm of statutory interpretation and policy making. 27 The
subject arises most often in the context of the doctrines that determine the scope
of judicial deference to agency decision making. This is because administrative
discretion resides in the space created by judicial deference. 28 Particularly
relevant in this respect is the Chevron doctrine, according to which courts defer
to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute the agency is responsible
for administering. 29 Chevron is the undisputed star in the vast body of case law
and scholarly literature addressing the two-sided coin of judicial deference and
administrative discretion. A recent article reports that the case for which the
doctrine is named "has been cited in more than 80,000 sources available on
Westlaw, including in roughly 15,000 judicial decisions and nearly 18,000 law
review articles and other secondary sources." 30 The sheer volume of these
citations suggests the overwhelming attention given to substantive discretion in
administration.
Often overlooked is that agencies also have substantial procedural discretion.
In Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court affirmed "that the formulation of
procedures [is] basically to be left within the discretion of the agencies to which
Congress ha[s] confided the responsibility for substantive judgments." 31 Vermont Yankee is best known for establishing the principle that courts should not
impose upon agencies procedural requirements beyond those that Congress has
created by statute. The Court also recognized, however, that agencies are not
similarly constrained. Although the courts lack authority to impose different or
additional procedures on agencies, agencies may choose to impose such procedures on themselves. 32 This is one consequence of the "very basic tenet of
administrative law that agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of
procedure." 33 In short, agency procedural discretion resides in Vermont Yankee's

27. See Emily S. Bremer & Sharon B. Jacobs, Agency Innovation in Vermont Yankee's White Space,
32 J. LAND UsE & ENvT'L. L. 523 (2017). But see Adrian Vermeule, Deference and Due Process, 129
HARV. L. REv. 1890, 1919 (2016) (defending judicial deference to agency procedural decisions).
28. See Peter Strauss, 'Deference' Is Too Confusing: Let's Call Them 'Chevron Space' and 'Skidmore Weight,' 112 CoLuM. L. REv. 1143 (2012).
29. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
30. See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 M1CH. L. REv. 1, 1
(2017).
31. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524
(1978).
32. See, e.g., New Life Evangelistic Ctr., Inc. v. Sebelius, 753 F. Supp. 2d 103, 121 (D.D.C. 2010)
("Agencies are, of course, free to adopt additional procedures as they see fit.").
33. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 543; see also 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012) ("Each agency is granted the
authority necessary to comply with the requirements of this subchapter through the issuance of rules or
otherwise."). Agencies often exercise this discretion to provide more procedure than is legally required.
See Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 859 (2009); Vermeule, supra note
27, at 1024-26.
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"white space." 34
Agency procedural discretion often extends to the full range of issues that
arise in administering adjudicatory programs, from the decision of whether to
adjudicate to the nature of the proceeding to the details of the procedures that
will be observed. At the highest level, an agency may be able to choose whether
to develop policy through rulemaking or adjudication. 35 Thus, the question of
whether to adjudicate at all may be one the agency is authorized to answer. An
agency that adjudicates will usually also have the authority to determine the
nature or type of the proceeding. 36 The first question here is whether the
agency's governing statute requires a Type A proceeding. 37 This is a matter of
statutory interpretation, and courts typically afford Chevron deference to an
agency's resolution of the issue. Indeed, courts have held that Type A adjudication is mandated only when the relevant statute requires the agency to conduct a
"hearing on the record." 38 In the absence of these magic words, the agency
generally has discretion to adjudicate outside of the APA. 39 In these circumstances, however, the agency could still choose to afford more procedural
protections than are required by statute by voluntarily conducting Type A
adjudication. 40 In similar fashion, agencies sometimes conduct Type B proceedings even in the absence of any statutory provision requiring a non-APA
evidentiary hearing. 41
The law imposes few procedural requirements that apply uniformly across
Type B adjudications, leaving agencies substantial procedural discretion over
these proceedings. The Constitution's Due Process Clause creates only modest

34. See Bremer & Jacobs, supra note 27, at 532-34.
35. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 1579-81 (1947) (Chenery /[); M. Elizabeth Magill,
Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. Cm. L. REv. 1383 (2004).
36. Absent a clear and unambiguous statutory provision that makes the choice for the agency.
37. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2012).
38. See Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2006);
Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1480-83 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also City of West
Chicago v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1983) (assuming that Congress does not intend the APA to
apply unless it uses the magic words). For example, a provision of the SEC's statute requires APA
adjudication by providing that "the Commission may impose a civil penalty on a person if the
Commission finds, on the record, after notice and opportunity for hearing" that the person has
committed certain violations. 15 U.S.C. § 77h-l(g)(l) (2012). With language such as this, a court would
likely hold under Chevron step one that the statute clearly requires a Type A proceeding.
39. This approach has been criticized for a variety of reasons, including on the grounds that the
phrase "hearing on the record" does not adequately distinguish between Type A and Type B adjudications. In both kinds of proceedings, the decision maker is expected to decide based on a record
compiled through an evidentiary hearing. See AsJMow, supra note 6, at 7.
40. See EEOC REPORT, supra note 10, at 23-24.
41. See, e.g., EEOC REPORT, supra note 10, at 13 (explaining that the EEOC operates its Federal
Sector Hearing Program in the absence of any reference to hearings in the relevant civil rights statutes).
This reality is at odds with the statement commonly made in administrative law textbooks that agencies
must be specifically authorized to adjudicate. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., ABBE R. GLUCK &
VICTORIA F. NOURSE, STATUTES, REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION: LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE
REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 184 (2014) ("Congress must delegate the capacity to issue adjudicative orders
having the force of law to the agency.").
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minimum requirements. 42 These minimums are determined through the application of a flexible, context-specific analysis. The agency is always the first to
conduct this analysis and, as a practical matter, often has the last word as to
what procedure due process requires. 43 Similarly, and as noted above, the APA
has almost nothing to say about the procedures that apply outside of Type A
adjudications. 44 In Type B proceedings, there is often another statute outside of
the APA that requires an evidentiary hearing. This statute may prescribe adjudicatory procedures, sometimes in great detail. Regardless of the procedural detail
specified by statute, however, Congress ordinarily leaves ample room for the
agency to design or embellish upon the procedures that will be followed.
Proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board provide a good example.
The America Invents Act (AIA) created several different proceedings for testing the validity of patents, specifying somewhat detailed procedures for each. 45
But the AIA also left room for the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to further
flesh out those procedures by regulation. 46
The nature or category of the adjudicatory proceeding has important implications for the nature and powers of the presiding official or "decider." As
previously noted, the presiding official in a Type A proceeding generally must
be an ALJ. This requirement significantly constrains the agency's discretion to
design the decider, because the APA47 and the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) statutes48 and regulations 49 provide the design. If a proceeding is
not required to be a Type A proceeding, an agency nonetheless likely has the
discretion to appoint ALJs to preside over the proceedings. As a practical
matter, however, this discretion is constrained by the OPM's role in the selection and appointment of ALJs. 50 More often, in the absence of a statutory

42. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970). But see, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
43. This phenomenon is frequently referred to as "administrative constitutionalism."' See Bremer &
Jacobs, supra note 27, at 531.
44. See supra note 20; see also Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 873 F.2d 325,
337 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[N]o provision of the APA contains specific procedures to govern an informal
agency adjudication .... ").
45. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
46. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 316(a) (2012) (providing that "[t]he Director shall prescribe regulations"
addressing various procedural matters in inter partes review proceedings). See generally Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for its Money: Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 236 (2015).
47. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2012) (defining the presiding official's powers).
48. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a), 1302(a), 1305, 3105, 3304, 3323(b), 3344, 4301(2)(D), 5372, and 7521
(2012).
49. See OPM Administrative Law Judge Program 5 C.F.R. pt. 930, subpt. B (2017).
50. The OPM, following its predecessor's (the Civil Service Commission (CSC)) practice, takes the
position that ALJs can only be appointed to preside over proceedings that are required by statute or
regulation to be conducted in accord with the APA. See EEOC REPORT, supra note 10, at 27-32. In only
two instances have agencies used their discretion to appoint ALJs in the absence of a statutory
requirement to do so. In both instances, the CSC refused to permit the appointments, and congressional
action ultimately was required to break the impasse. See id. at 11-12.
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requirement to appoint ALJs, agencies elect to use non-ALJ adjudicators. 51
B. Designing the Decider
The minimal legal constraints applicable in Type B adjudication leave agencies largely free to "design the decider," i.e., to control the constellation of
characteristics that define the presiding official. These characteristics can be
divided into two general categories. The first category includes the various
characteristics that determine the decider's identity, including the official's title,
job description, rate of pay, qualifications, and position within the agency. These
elements directly and indirectly affect the separation of functions within the
agency, as well as the manner and extent of the decider's accountability.
Second, an agency has discretion to define the decider's powers. Of particular
interest here are the powers to collect information, to resolve the dispute, and to
order remedies. These powers directly affect the nature, basis, and form of the
adjudicator's decision.
This Section explores the scope and exercise of these aspects of agency
procedural discretion. To make the discussion more concrete and to demonstrate
the variety that agency discretion has yielded, this Section offers examples
drawn from the ACUS-Stanford database of Type B adjudication programs. 52
The ACUS-Stanford database includes information about the representation of
private parties, representation of agencies, availability and types of discovery,
subpoena authority, ex parte contacts, types of hearings and appeals, crossexamination, information about adjudicators, information about alternative dispute resolution, caseload statistics, number of adjudicators, case types, and
ability to appeal. Of the 133 agencies included in the database, 87 conduct
administrative "adjudications" of some kind. 53 Most relevant for this Article's
purposes, the database provides information about presiding officials for 524
different adjudicatory programs, including 396 programs at the hearing level
and 128 at the appellate level. 54 The ACUS-Stanford database offers a wealth of
information about these officials, including their employing agency, the name of
the office within which the adjudicatory program is housed, the adjudicatory
scheme, the adjudicator's title, and whether the adjudicator is subject to performance evaluations, is employed full-time as an adjudication officer, and is
subject to quality control measures or production goals. 55 It is common for there
to be more than one kind of decider within a single adjudicatory program. The
51. See EEOC REPORT, supra note 10, at 6.
52. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
53. See Agencies, ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, https://acus.law.stanford.edu/agencies [https://perma.cc/
PE8G-Q77Q]; see also 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (2012) ("'[O]rder' means the whole or a part of a final
disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter
other than rule making but including licensing .... "); 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) ('"[A]djudication' means
agency process for the formulation of an order .... ").
54. See Information About Adjudicators, ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, https://acus.law.stanford.edu/reports/
adjudicators [https://perma.cc/2KWY-B46F].
55. See id.
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database consequently includes information about 784 kinds of adjudicators,
including 577 at the hearing level and 207 at the appellate level. 56
1. The Decider's Identity

Agency discretion to design the decider in Type B adjudication first encompasses authority over the characteristics and rules that determine who within the
agency will preside over hearings. There is great variety in how agencies
exercise this discretion to define the decider's identity.
The characteristics that help define the decider's identity include that official's title, job description, and rate of pay. In Type B proceedings, the decider is
often called an "administrative judge" (AJ), although agencies may use any
other title. 57 There is no cross-cutting legal principal that restricts the range of
possibilities here. 58 Moving beyond the decider's title, the agency also has
discretion over this person's job description. The job description determines,
among other things, whether the official is employed full-time as an adjudicator
or has other, non-adjudicatory responsibilities. In addition, an agency can
decide whether and how to subject its adjudicators to performance reviews,
decision-making quotas, or other quality control measures. The agency also
generally has some control over its adjudicators' rate of pay and eligibility for
raises. 59
A handful of examples suffice to demonstrate the variation that occurs as a
result of agency discretion over these three aspects of the decider's identity:
• A "Hearing Officer" is "a Coast Guard officer or employee who has
been delegated the authority to assess civil penalties" 60 in the context of
"all statutory penalty provisions that the Coast Guard is authorized to
enforce." 61 Hearing Officers are employed solely as adjudicators and are

56. See id. ACUS collected the information from publicly available sources such as the Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) and then asked individual agencies to verify the information and correct it
as necessary. Of the 784 entries on adjudicators, only 260 are verified, including 181 at the hearing
level and 79 at the appellate level.
57. See Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2016-4, Evidentiary Hearings Not Required by
the Administrative Procedure Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,312, 94,314 (Dec. 23, 2016).
58. It is possible, though rare, that the statute the agency is charged with administering may supply a
term or title for Type B adjudicators. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2012) (referring to "the administrative
patent judges"' who preside over PTAB proceedings); see also Department of Commerce Hearing-Level
Procedures, ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, https://acus.law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/usdcpate0021-hearinglevel-procedures [https://perma.cc/4PD7-RWGL].
59. Government-wide personnel rules, regulations, and policies constrain agency discretion somewhat, although an agency is likely to consider the effect of those rules when it makes the initial decision
about what kind of employee will adjudicate. OPM is responsible for these personnel rules, regulations,
and policies. See 5 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012) (authorizing the President to delegate authority for personnel
management to OPM).
60. 33 C.F.R. § l.07-5(b) (2017); see Department of Homeland Security Hearing-Level Procedures,
ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, http://acus.law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/dhsccghp0004-hearing-levelprocedures-O [https://perma.cc/5Y6E-WNNA].
61. 33 C.F.R. § 1.07-1 (2017).
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paid at the Senior Officer rank of Commander (CDR), at the paygrade of
0-5, which is roughly equivalent to the civilian GS-13 or GS-14. 62
• Under the Department of Veterans Affairs' procurement suspension and
debarment regulations, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Office of
Acquisition and Logistics is authorized to adjudicate as the "Suspending
and Debarring Official (SD0)." 63 This official has responsibilities in
addition to serving as the SDO and is a member of the Senior Executive
Service (SES). This official is accordingly compensated according to the
SES pay scale. 64
• In the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) Office of
Field Programs, within the Federal Sector Hearings Program, an AJ who
is also known as an "Attorney Examiner" reviews discrimination complaints by federal employees. These officials are employed full-time as
adjudicators and are paid as GS-12, GS-13, or GS-14 employees. 65
• "Board Judges" preside over hearings held by the Civilian Board of
Contract Appeals, a division of the General Services Administration
(GSA) that adjudicates contract disputes between private contractors
and civilian federal agencies. Board Judges enjoy many of the protections afforded to ALJs and are employed full-time as adjudicators. 66

62. See 0-5 Basic Pay Rate-Officer Military Payscales, FEDERALPAY.ORG, https://www.federalpay.org/
military/grades/o-5 [https://perma.cc/4SRA-3GTQ]. The General Schedule (GS) establishes the base
pay for civilian federal government employees, which is then adjusted based on locality. See Pay &
Leave, OPM.Gov, https ://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/2018/generalschedule/ [https://perma.cc/UBT2-2GP8]. The GS schedule has 15 "grades"' or levels of pay, and within
each grade, there are 10 "steps" that allow for pay to be refined according to the employee's years of
service, etc.: For 2018, the base pay of a GS-13 employee is between $75,628 (at Step I) and $98,317
(at Step 10), while the base pay of a GS-14 is between $89,370 (at Step I) and $116,181 (at Step 10).
See Salary Table 2018-GS, https ://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salarytables/pdf/2018/GS. pdf [https ://perma.cc/2K6W-MKVN].
63. See Department of Veterans Affairs Hearing-Level Procedures, ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, https://
acus.law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/dovaproc0009-hearing-level-procedures [https://perma.cc/KJ6Z3JU9]; 48 C.F.R. § 9.403 (2017). These officials are vested with discretion to refer fact-finding to
another presiding official, who conducts the evidentiary hearing and issues written findings of fact. See
48 CFR 9.406-3(d)(2), 9.407-3(d)(2) (2017). The regulations otherwise provide no guidance or
requirements for the presiding official.
64. See Senior Executive Compensation, OPM.Gov, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/seniorexecutive-service/compensation [https://perma.cc/T3VK-YFJC]. For 2018, the SES pay scale is between $126,148 and $189,600. See Executive Order 13819, Adjustments to Certain Rates of Pay (Dec.
22, 2017), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/pay-executive-order2018-adjustments-of-certain-rates-of-pay.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YWF-J4KJ].
65. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Hearing-Level Procedures, ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, https://acus.law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/eeocfeds0002-hearing-level-procedures [https://perma.
cc/45S2-TU9E]; see also supra note 62 (discussing the GS pay scale and the rates of pay for GS-13 and
GS-14 employees). The 2018 base pay for a GS-12 employee is between $63,600 (at Step I) and
$82,680 (at Step 10). See Salary Table 2018-GS, supra note 62.
66. See AsIMow, supra note 6, at 40; General Services Administration Hearing-Level Procedures,
ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, https://acus.law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/gsaocbca0004-hearing-levelprocedures-0 [https://perma.cc/R4NB-Y755]. The CA pay scale establishes a salary of $164,200 for the
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They are compensated on the Contract Appeals (CA) pay plan in the
range of 1-3. 67
• The "Chief Financial Officer" and "Deputy Chief Financial Officer"
preside over proceedings involving a debtor's request for review of a
Notice of Debt Collection regarding a delinquent debt owed to the
United States Peace Corps. These officials are not employed full-time as
adjudicators and therefore have other responsibilities. 68 They are paid
according to the Department of State's Foreign Service pay scale. 69
This short list merely hints at the diversity among deciders. Other titles for
non-ALJ adjudicators include "Examiner," 70 "Hearing Officer," 71 "Judgment
Officer," 72 "Presiding Officer," 73 and "Special Master." 74 As the discussion
above demonstrates, there is also seemingly limitless variety with respect the
job responsibilities, oversight, and salary levels of Type B adjudicators. 75
Agencies may also establish employment qualifications, another important
aspect of the decider's identity. These include basic qualifications unrelated to
the agency's specific statutory mission, such as whether the decider is an

Chairman of the Board, $159,274 for the Vice Chairman, and $154,348 for other members of the
Board. See Salary Table for Members of the Boards of Contract Appeals, https://www.opm.gov/policydata-oversight/pay-leave/ salaries-wages/salary-tables/pdf/2018/BCA. pdf [https ://perma. cc/N 5FVYHSB].
67. See General Services Administration Hearing-Level Procedures, ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, supra
note 66.
68. See United States Peace Corps Hearing-Level Procedures, ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, https://acus.
law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/pecodebt0002-hearing-level-procedures [https://perma.cc/6LUP-PEF5].
69. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2018 FOREIGN SERVICE (FS) SALARY TABLE (2018), https://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/277016.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4BP-8REH]. The Deputy Chief Financial Officer is paid at Class 1 of the FS pay scale, with base pay ranging from $105,123 (at Step 1) to $13,659
(at Step 14), while the Chief Financial Officer is a Senior Foreign Service official whose pay range is
between $126,148 and $189,600. See id.
70. See Overseas Private Investment Corporation Hearing-Level Procedures, ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, https://acus.law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/opicpemp000l-hearing-level-procedures [https://perma.
cc/4WN6-P28C].
71. See Department of Agriculture Hearing-Level Procedures, ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, https://acus.
law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/usdanado0002-hearing-level-procedures [https://perma.cc/5ZS2-G5A6].
To comply with an 8th Circuit decision on the matter, Lane v. USDA, 120 F.3d 106 (8th Cir. 1997),
USDA treats this as a Type A program, but by statute the presiding officials are not ALJs, see AsIMow,
supra note 6, at 36-37.
72. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission Hearing-Level Procedures, ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, https://acus.law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/cftcrepa0005-hearing-level-procedures [https://perma.
cc/LC72-J9M4].
73. See Department of Housing and Urban Development Hearing-Level Procedures, ADJUDICATION
RESEARCH, https://acus.law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/hudomanu0004-hearing-level-procedures [https://
perma.cc/SYN7-LHHQ].
74. See Department of Justice Hearing-Level Procedures, ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, https://acus.law.
stanford.edu/hearing-level/dojxvcfx0009-hearing-level-procedures [https ://perma.cc/APF2-VKGS].
75. Just in the short list provided here, four separate pay scales are used, and the pay range is
breathtakingly broad, ranging from a low of $63,700 to a high of $189,600.
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attorney. 76 In addition, Type B agencies may require certain technical or subject
matter expertise or experience as a precondition for employment. 77 For ex ample, the EEOC requires the AJs in its Federal Sector Hearing Program to
have specialized knowledge and experience with the civil rights laws. 78 Similarly, GSA requires its Board Judges to have a minimum of five years of
experience with public contract law. 79 In some instances, Congress has directed
an agency to employ adjudicators who have specialized qualifications. For
example, the AIA directed the PTO to hire as administrative patent judges
"persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability," a statutory
directive that the PTO has implemented by employing administrative patent
judges with the expertise necessary to determine patent validity. 80
These matters are neither superficial nor insignificant: they determine the
adjudicator's role and position within the agency. Job descriptions and qualifications may affect whether an adjudicator has responsibilities in addition to
presiding over hearings. This may have implications for the separation of
functions within the agency. Salary decisions, performance reviews, quality
control measures, and production goals may improve the decider's accountability, undermine the decider's independence, or both. 81
Agencies also have discretion to address these higher-level considerations
directly through rules designed to preserve the separation of functions and to
promote decider accountability. Separation of functions rules may prohibit an
adjudicator from having certain other responsibilities, such as a role in investigating, prosecuting, or advocating in the cases they will later decide. Many-but
not all-agencies authorized to perform these various functions have regulations designed to separate them. 82 Agencies also have discretion to design how
an officer's initial adjudicatory decision will be subject to reconsideration,
review, or appeal. 83 The agency may reserve for itself the authority to make the
final decision, regardless of the initial decision provided by the adjudicator. 84

76. In APA adjudication, by contrast, OPM is instead vested with the authority to determine the
ALJ's qualifications. See 5 U.S.C. § 5372(b)(2) (2012); see also 5 C.F.R. §§ 930.201-930.211 (2017)
(OPM regulations implementing its statutory authority to regulate the selection, compensation, and
tenure of ALJs employed by other agencies).
77. Barnett, supra note 4, at 1667.
78. See EEOC REPORT, supra note 10, at 31.
79. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
80. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012).
81. Cf Stephen B. Burbank, What Do We Mean by "Judicial Independence"?, 64 Omo ST. L.J. 323,
331 (2003) (stating that "judicial independence and judicial accountability are different sides of the
same coin"').
82. See AsrMow, supra note 6, at 21-22.
83. The Administrative Conference has recommended that "[a]gencies that decide a significant
number of cases should use adjudicators-rather than agency heads, boards, or panels-to conduct
hearings and provide initial decisions, subject to higher-level review." Admin. Conf. of the U.S.,
Recommendation 2016-4, Evidentiary Hearings Not Required by the Administrative Procedure Act, 81
Fed. Reg. 94,312, 94,316 (Dec. 23, 2016).
84. Indeed, even in Type A adjudication, the APA expressly reserves to the agency the power to
make the final decision. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012) ("On appeal from or review of the initial
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2. The Decider's Powers
In Type B adjudication, the agency's discretion to design the decider also
includes the ability to define that official's powers. 85 First, agencies may adopt a
variety of rules that determine what information is contained in the hearing
record and is otherwise available to the decider. For example, some agencies
empower adjudicators to order pre-hearing discovery, while other agencies do
not. 86 In a similar fashion, some agencies empower adjudicators to keep information submitted by the parties confidential, while other agencies do not. Most,
but not all, Type B agencies adopt regulations regarding the decider's ability to
engage in ex parte communications. 87 These regulations address whether and in
what circumstances the adjudicator may communicate with persons outside the
hearing, including with other staff within the agency. 88 Although ex parte rules
are best known for protecting the integrity of the process and promoting the
separation of functions, these rules also affect what kind of information is
available to the presiding official.
A second type of rules that define the decider's powers relate to the nature,
basis, and format of the adjudicator's decision. Agency regulations may empower the presiding official to adjudicate for a class 89 or resolve disputes on
summary judgment. 90 Other regulations may grant the decider remedial powers,
address the finality of the decision, or require that the decision be in writing. 91
As previously explained, a Type B adjudication is, by definition, one in which
the exclusive record principle is observed. This is a matter of definition,
however, and not of legal requirement. For this reason, the ACUS study was
able to identify some Type B agencies that lack any publicly available, written

decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it
may limit the issues on notice or by rule."').
85. There are certain powers, such as the authority to issue subpoenas that an agency can give to its
adjudicators only if Congress has first given that power to the agency. For example, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 empowered the EEOC to issue administrative subpoenas, and the EEOC has in
turn granted that power to its federal sector adjudicators. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (2012); 29 U.S.C.
§ 161(1) (2012); Alison B. Marshall & Jennifer C. Everett, EEOC Subpoena Power, 37 EMP. RELATIONS
L.J. 3 (2011) (reviewing issues that arise in recent cases addressing the scope of the EEOC's subpoena
power).
86. See As1Mow, supra note 6, at 35.
87. See id. at 20-21.
88. For example, EEOC's federal sector hearing procedures do not prohibit ex parte communications, although such a prohibition is found in an EEOC order. See EEOC REPORT, supra note 10, at 9-10
& n.58; EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY CoMM'N, ORDER No. 690.001 (Jan. 30, 2002); see also EQUAL EMP'T
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, HANDBOOK FOR ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES ch. 1 pt. E (2002), http://www.eeoc.gov/
federal/ajhandbook.cfm#initial [https://perma.cc/4RXM-YX7L].
89. See Michael Sant' Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class Action, 126 YALE
L.J. 1634 (2017); Michael Sant'Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112
CoLuM. L. REv. 1992 (2012).
90. See Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 70-3, Summary Decision in Administrative
Adjudication, 38 Fed. Reg. 19,785 (July 23, 1973).
91. See As1Mow, supra note 6, at 32-33.
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rule requiring observance of the exclusive record principle. 92 As with agency
discretion to define the decider's identity, agency discretion over the decider's
power yields broad diversity across Type B programs.
Ill.

REEVALUATING PROCEDURAL DISCRETION

Agency discretion to design the decider thus gives an agency control over the
constellation of discrete elements that determine the nature, position, and
powers of the officials who preside over adjudicatory hearings. This discretion
offers benefits to agencies, regulated parties, and the public. But its exercise
also imposes costs, both at the level of individual adjudicatory programs and
from a broader, system-wide perspective.
A. Benefits of Procedural Discretion
The principal-and most frequently invoked-benefit of agency procedural
discretion is that it enables an agency to design its processes in a manner best
suited to meet the unique needs of that agency and the regulatory program at
issue. This approach is grounded in the concept of comparative institutional
advantage. It takes as its premise the notion that the agency is better positioned
than Congress or the courts to select the optimal procedural design. 93 As
Professor Asimow has explained: "[ w ]hether a particular procedural device
should be employed (and the precise form in which it is provided) always
requires a careful balance of the conflicting variables involved in choosing
optimal procedures-accuracy, efficiency, and acceptability to the parties. " 94
Although it may seem strange to refer to the presiding official as a "procedural
device," the question of who within an agency will preside over a hearing and
issue the agency's first (and perhaps final) decision is a central component of the
overall procedural design. For this reason, it is properly subject to the flexible,
context-specific analysis that governs other questions of procedural design in
administrative adjudication.
This approach implicitly recognizes a link between administrative procedure
and substantive regulatory policy. 95 To recognize such a link is consistent with
the Supreme Court's decision in Vermont Yankee, which treated procedural
discretion as derivative of an agency's substantive statutory authority. 96 Congress also seems to recognize a relationship between substance and procedure.

92. See AsIMow, supra note 6, at 35. As Professor Asimow notes, it is possible that these agencies
adhere to the principle without having codified it in a procedural regulation, manual, or other source of
procedural law. Id.
93. See Bremer & Jacobs, supra note 27, at 541-42.
94. AsrMow, supra note 6, at 19.
95. See, e.g., Bremer & Jacobs, supra note 27, at 526 ("Procedural choices are inextricably
intertwined with substantive ends."').
96. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524
(1978) (holding that the Commission acted within its statutory authority when it considered the
environmental impact of spent fuel processes in licensing procedures).
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When it has enacted agency-and program-specific procedural statutes that deviate from the APA's adjudication structure, it has often done so in the service of
substantive ends. For example, the AIA created detailed, patent-specific adjudicatory processes for a variety of patent-related reasons, including to facilitate the
invalidation and narrowing of certain patents thought to interfere with innovation and economic growth. 97 The appointment of expert "administrative patent
judges" was one aspect of this substantively-focused procedural reform. 98 Finally, agencies also seem to view procedural discretion as a valuable and
necessary component of their substantive statutory authority. Procedures (in
adjudication and in connection with other kinds of agency action) are often
carefully crafted with an eye toward improving an agency's ability to efficiently
and effectively achieve its regulatory or other substantive mission. The EEOC's
practice of hiring administrative judges with civil rights experience to preside
over federal sector hearings is one example of how agency discretion to design
the decider can be used to further an agency's substantive mission. 99
A secondary benefit of procedural discretion is that it enables agencies to
offer greater procedural protections than would otherwise be required by law.
As previously explained, adjudication outside of the APA offers few procedural
protections to those whose interests are at stake in the proceedings. Even when
there are powerful normative reasons to impose additional procedures on administrative agencies, Congress often lacks the political will to do it. ' 00 In the
absence of congressional action, however, procedural discretion empowers
agencies to independently and voluntarily take action to improve administrative
procedure. 101 Agencies will not always (and perhaps should not always) take
the most procedurally protective path. 102 For example, agencies have historically avoided appointing ALJs whenever possible. 103 Nonetheless, the agencies'
ability to be procedurally innovative and progressive benefits regulated parties
and the public.

97. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 46, at 242, 255 (explaining that one of the many goals of the AIA
was to weed out invalid patents and narrow their claims).
98. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012).
99. See EEOC REPORT, supra note 10, at 31.
100. See, e.g., Asimow, supra note 2, at 1008-09 ("The public would benefit if more cases were
heard by ALJs because ALJs enjoy both de jure and de facto independence of the agencies for which
they decide cases. It is unlikely, however, that Congress will be persuaded to do so in the foreseeable
future."').
101. This is the premise of many ACUS recommendations, including the recent recommendation on
evidentiary hearings conducted outside of the APA. See Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation
2016-4, Evidentiary Hearings Not Required by the Administrative Procedure Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,312,
94,314 (Dec. 23, 2016); see also, e.g., Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2011-5, Incorporation by Reference, 77 Fed. Reg. 2257 (Jan. 17, 2012) (urging agencies to voluntarily take action to
improve the online availability of copyrighted materials incorporated by reference into federal
regulations).
102. See Verkuil, supra note 10.
103. See Asimow, supra note 2, at 1009 & n.36.
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B. Costs of Procedural Discretion

The first potential cost of agency discretion to design the decider is that it
may imperil decider independence. An agency's ability to set the terms of its
adjudicators' employment gives that agency some measure of influence over
how those officials decide the matters that come before them. Agency authority
to subject adjudicators to performance reviews, quality control measures, or
decision-making quotas similarly gives the agency some control over the decision-making process. This control may offer improved accountability. But the
flipside is that it erodes the decider's independence. This is precisely why the
APA took these aspects of control over ALJs away from adjudicating agencies
and vested them instead in the Civil Service Commission and its successor,
OPM. 104 A Type B agency's ability to require its adjudicators to have certain
subject matter expertise as a condition of employment presents a similar
problem. Having a specialized decider may have benefits. 105 But it also increases the likelihood that adjudicators will come to their jobs with wellformed, preexisting commitments and beliefs about the optimal policy to be
enforced through agency adjudication. This is why OPM does not permit
agencies to require subject matter expertise as a condition of ALJ appointment. 106 Furthermore, the role of a Type B adjudicator is "to preside impartially
over fair hearings that implement and administer agency policy." 107 In other
words, the adjudicator's "role demands adherence to agency policy and goals," 108
and not independence in the judicial sense. This may hold true regardless of the
precise details of how a particular agency has elected to exercise its discretion
to design the decider. Finally, all of these issues may be further compounded if
the hearing structure contemplates that the adjudicator's employer (i.e., the
agency) will always and necessarily be one of the parties to the hearing. 109 For
these reasons, reduced independence may be inherent in the administrative

104. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (holding that federal executive officials
entitled to qualified immunity and persons performing adjudicatory functions are entitled to absolute
immunity from damages); Ramspeck v. Trial Exam'r Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 132 (1953); Nash v.
Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 14-16 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that alleged invasion of ALJ's statutory right to
decisional independence was justiciable controversy and there was standing); Asimow, supra note 2, at
1009. OPM also ensures that all ALJs are paid according to a special pay scale, according to which
compensation is both higher than the GS scale and is not subject to the adjudicating agency's control.
See 5 C.F.R. § 930.205 (2017); Pay & Leave: Pay Administration, OPM.Gov, https://www.opm.gov/
policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/pay-administration/fact-sheets/administrative-law-judge-pay-system/
[https://perma.cc/HFS3-26Y7].
105. Cf J. Jonas Anderson, Judicial Lobbying, 91 WASH. L. REv. 401, 456-57 (2016) (noting benefits
of specialized judges).
106. Agencies were once permitted to require ALJs to have specialized experience as a condition of
appointment. The process was called "selective certification," and it was heavily criticized and
ultimately abandoned. See John T. Miller, Jr., The Vice of Selective Certification in the Appointment of
Hearing Examiners, 20 ADMJN. L. REv. 477 (1968).
107. Moliterno, supra note 23, at 1192.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1195.
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justice that can be offered through non-APA adjudication. 110
From a system-wide perspective, the exercise of agency discretion to design
the decider defeats the APA's purpose of promoting procedural uniformity
across agencies. 111 In Type A adjudication, OPM's centralized authority over the
certification, selection, appointment, and tenure of ALJs promotes substantial
uniformity across agencies. 112 The APA's adjudication provisions also promote
uniformity by (among other things) specifying the ALJ's core powers. 113 In
adjudication outside the APA, where agencies have discretion over these elements, uniformity is nowhere to be found. Indeed, Professor Asimow describes
"the world of Type B adjudication" as being "wildly diverse" 114 and "vast and
formless," 115 while Type C adjudication is "even more wildly diverse." 116
Indeed, the ACUS-Stanford database does not include information about Type C
adjudication schemes because such information about them is so voluminous,
varied, and difficult to find. 117 This reality makes it very difficult to assess
whether and to what extent agency adjudication is-in the aggregateconsistent with basic due process norms. In connection with this, and harkening
back to the principal benefits of procedural discretion, it is not clear that
agencies have special expertise in determining what due process requires.
Agencies may have the advantage in tailoring adjudicatory processes to the
needs of individual regulatory programs. But that is not the kind of expertise
that is relevant in balancing due process values to ensure an adequate level of
decider independence.
This hints at a third, derivative cost of agency discretion to design the
decider: the diversity it facilitates makes non-APA adjudication significantly
less transparent than Type A adjudication. In Type B adjudication, information
must always be agency-specific, and the details of individual adjudicatory
programs are often difficult to find, scattered across various sources, or simply
not written down in any publicly available location. 118 This is why studying
federal administrative adjudication in the aggregate is such a daunting prospect
for scholars and experts. Even agencies themselves may not have access to
adequate information about adjudicatory procedures, a reality that would make

110. Cf Barnett, supra note 4.
111. See Asimow, supra note 2; Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: Is the Quest for Uniformity
Faltering?, 10 AM. U. ADMJN. L.J. 65 (1996).
112. See, e.g., EEOC Report, supra note 10, at 27-32 (explaining OPM's role).
113. See 5 U.S.C. § 556 (2012).
114. AsJMow, supra note 6, at 18.
115. Id. at 4.
116. Id. at 19.
117. See id. at 2.
118. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. For example, in a HUD adjudication program under
the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974 (NMHCSSA),
"[ n Jo information on the presiding officer is set forth in the regulations except to note that he/she is
appointed by the Secretary to hear any Informal Presentation of Views involving oral testimony."
Housing and Urban Development Hearing-Level Procedures, ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, https://acus.law.
stanford.edu/hearing-level/hudomanu0004-hearing-level-procedures [https://perma.cc/H427-2V8J].
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it difficult for them to thoughtfully develop and maintain those procedures. This
can be contrasted to the world of informal rulemaking, which is made uniform
through APA-prescribed procedures that have been fleshed out by judicial case
law. These sources of law create a clear conception of informal rulemaking. By
contrast, there is no single, clear, uniform understanding of what constitutes
adjudication outside of the APA. This makes it impossible for affected parties to
have clear procedural expectations. It also prevents a system-wide evaluation of
the integrity of administrative adjudication. These problems deserve greater
attention.
CONCLUSION

Agency procedural discretion in Type B adjudication has contributed to the
emergence of a vast and formless world of administrative adjudication outside
of the APA. Agency discretion to design the decider is illustrative of this larger
phenomenon. In this context, procedural discretion may simply be a natural
consequence of the legal reality that Congress has vested the agency with the
authority to adjudicate. 119 And the resulting specialization conveys some benefits. But it also imposes costs-to decider independence, uniformity, and
transparency. These costs have been acknowledged, but they deserve greater
attention. Individual agencies can adhere to best practices that can help to
mitigate these costs within individual adjudicatory programs. 12° Congressional
action may be necessary, however, to address the issues on a system-wide basis.

119. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
120. See Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2016-4, Evidentiary Hearings Not Required by
the Administrative Procedure Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,312, 94,314 (Dec. 23, 2016).

